I compare unemployment expectations from the Michigan Survey of Consumers to VAR forecastable movements in unemployment. I document three key facts. First, one-half to one-third of the population expects unemployment to rise when it is falling at the end of a recession even though the VAR predicts the fall in unemployment. Second, more people expect unemployment to rise when it is falling at the end of a recession than expect it to rise when it is rising at the beginning of a recession even though the VAR predicts these changes. Finally, the lag change in unemployment is almost as important as the VAR forecast in predicting the fraction of the population that expects unemployment to rise. Professional forecasters do not exhibit these discrepancies. Least squares learning or real time expectations do little to help explain these facts. However, delayed updating of expectations can explain some of these facts and extrapolative expectations explains these facts best. Individuals with higher income or education are only slightly less likely to have expectations which di¤er from the VAR and those whose expect more unemployment when the VAR predicts otherwise are 8-10 percent less likely to believe it is a good time to make a major purchase.
In modern macroeconomic theory, expectations about the future drive current economic activity. In general, models assume rational expectations: agents know the true model and use it to form expectations. However, this assumption is not without controversy. Sargent (2001) and Evans & Honkapohja (2001) advocate models where agents learn the true model over time. Mankiw & Reis (2002) argue for models with agents who use outdated information to form their expectations. Given this plurality of views, work testing models with microlevel expectations data can provide important insight into the formation of expectations.
Consequently, I provide a detailed analysis of unemployment expectations from the Survey of Consumers conducted by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center. The measurement of unemployment expectations stems from the following question: "How about people out of work during the coming 12 months -do you think that there will be more unemployment than now, about the same, or less?" I compare the sign of the unemployment change that the respondents expect with forecastable movements in unemployment (predicted by a four variable VAR). There are important di¤erences between the consumers'expectations and forecastable movements in unemployment. The three key discrepancies are: 1. In the six months after a recession's end-when unemployment is falling-one-half to one-third of the population expects unemployment to rise even though the VAR predicts the fall in unemployment. 2. At a recession's beginningwhen unemployment is rising-fewer people expected unemployment to rise than at the recession's end -when unemployment is falling-even though the VAR predicts the rise and fall of unemployment. 3. Controlling for the predictions of the VAR, the lag change in unemployment is almost as important as the VAR forecast of the future unemployment change in predicting the percent of the population that expects unemployment to rise.
Given the discrepancies between household expectations and VAR forecasts, I examine the ability of various models of expectations to match these facts. A least squares learning model and a model that uses real time data fail to explain these facts. A model with 1 delayed updating of expectations can help explain why there are so few pessimists (de…ned as individuals who expect unemployment to rise) at the beginning of a recession but not why there are so many pessimists at the end of a recession. An extrapolative expectations model where some agents form expectations by extrapolating current trends into the future can explain all the facts. I also show that even a univariate forecasting rule correctly predicts the sign of unemployment changes and that professional forecasters'expectations are much more consistent with the VAR than those of households.
Additionally, those with more education or a higher income are less likely to have expectations which di¤er from the VAR: however the di¤erence is not economically signi…cant.
Expectational discrepancies are not con…ned to an economically unimportant fraction of the population, but evenly distributed across income and education groups. These expectational discrepancies a¤ect attitudes concerning whether it is a good time to make a major purchases, e.g.: a house, a car, or a durable good. Speci…cally, when an individual expects unemployment to rise when in fact the VAR predicts it will fall, she is 8-10% less likely to think that it is a good time to make a major purchase. Carroll (2003) and Mankiw et al. (2003) use the Michigan data to evaluate models of expectations. However, these papers test only one expectations model, where individuals infrequently update their information set. Additionally, these papers mainly study in ‡ation expectations. While the highest quality data available are for in ‡ation expectations, there are serious limitations of focusing on in ‡ation expectations. First, in ‡ation expectations are most important in models of price setting. Since this is a …rm's decision, it is not clear that the populations they study correspond to individuals choosing prices in macroeconomic models 1 .
Second, for the survey population where expectational errors are most likely and empirically are most signi…cant, households from the Michigan survey, macroeconomic models suggest that expectations about future consumption, or the future state of the economy, are more important in determining household decisions than expectations about in ‡ation. Souleles (2004) analyzes the survey's questions concerning expectations of future business conditions, …nancial positions, and household income and …nds the forecast errors exhibit excess sensitivity, do not average out to zero over the twenty year sample period, and are correlated with demographic variables. My paper di¤ers from the work of Souleles by focusing on unemployment expectations and business cycle induced changes in unemployment.
Carroll (2003) focuses on in ‡ation expectations but also studies the Michigan unemployment expectations index: the percent of individuals who expect less unemployment minus the percent that expect more unemployment. He shows the dynamics of the index are well modeled by an equation that puts one-third of its weight on the professional forecast and two-thirds weight on the lag value of the index. Curtin (2003) shows that the same index is correlated with future unemployment changes. However, when he regresses the unemployment change on changes in the index, he …nds the residuals are autocorrelated.
Like Carroll and Curtin I …nd evidence suggestive of serial correlation in the expectational errors of household though my work di¤ers from theirs in substantial ways. First, the facts concerning excessive pessimism at the end of a recession and insu¢ cient pessimism at the beginning of a recession are new. Second, I test the ability of a large number of theories to account for these facts. Third, I use the methodology of Carlson & Parkin (1975) to provide a rigorous mapping from models of expectation formation to equations that relate macro aggregates to aggregates of qualitative expectations like the indexes in the work of Caroll and Curtin. This methodology generates important insights. I show that expectations based solely on a distribution around the VAR expectation underestimate by a factor of 50 the importance of lag unemployment in predicting the fraction of people who expect unemployment to rise. Finally, contrary to Carroll, I …nd features of the data unaccounted for by the delay model: for example the large number of individuals expecting unemployment to rise at the end of a recession. Due to the mean reverting nature of unemployment, the delay model generates very few pessimistic predictions of the recovery even based on outdated information while extrapolation results in these predictions. …nancial markets, housing markets and macroeconomic forecasting (see Fuster et al. (2010) for a survey). By focusing on recessions, when unemployment begins to revert to its mean,
I am able to directly analyze the ability of agents to anticipate this mean reversion.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data while section 3 establishes the three key empirical facts outlined above. Section 4 examines the ability of four di¤erent models of expectation formation to address these facts. Section 5 examines data from simulated, heterogenous, structural expectations models. Section 6 shows that a univariate forecast can correctly predict the sign of unemployment changes and that professional forecasters forecast unemployment much better than households do. Section 7 examines the ability of individual characteristics to predict expectational errors and the in ‡uence of expectations on buying attitudes. Section 8 concludes.
Data
The data come from the Survey of Consumers conducted by the University of Michigan The data contain information on the respondent's: sex, age, education, marital status, income and race. Mean household income in year 2000 dollars is 46,169. The mean age is 47, mean education is 13 years, and 32% have graduated college. The percent of the sample that gave a valid answer to the questions is high, ranging from 93% for income to 99%
for if the respondent was a college graduate, which speaks to the reliability of these data.
Additionally, the appendix reports deciles of the income and education distribution which are consistent with that of the U.S. population as a whole. Finally, 84% of the sample is White, 9% Black, 5% Hispanic, 1% Asian, and 1% Native American.
The survey asks the respondents about economically signi…cant purchases: if they think it is a good time to by a house, a car or a durable good. In general, individuals have upbeat buying attitudes. They think it is a good time to make a major purchase about two-thirds of the time. 
Empirical Facts
Figure 1 plots the unemployment rate and pessimism (the fraction of people who expect unemployment to rise over the next year). Vertical lines mark the peak and trough of unemployment. At the peaks, around 35% of the population expects unemployment to rise, even though it is about to fall sharply. At the troughs a similar percent of the population expects unemployment to rise, even though it is about to rise sharply. During the recession of 2000, pessimism was 10 percentage points lower at the trough than at the peak of unemployment.
If unemployment changes were not forecastable then pessimism should not be sensitive to the level of unemployment. However, unemployment is strongly mean reverting and we would expect future unemployment changes to be forecastable. This plot then suggests that, relative to a statistical forecast, pessimism levels may be too high at the end of a recession and too low at the beginning of a recession. It also suggests that individual expectations may be overly-in ‡uenced by past changes. This section establishes these facts more formally.
extent to which these movements are predictable, I calculate the average of these variables across recessions using the following three regressions 2 :
Y it equals P it ; U t ; or E U t . P it is one if the individual expects there to be more unemployment at time t 12 and zero otherwise 3 , U t , the change in the unemployment rate, is u t u t 12 4 and E U t is the VAR prediction of U t as I describe below.
To forecast unemployment I use the following four-variable, four-lag VAR:
where z t = fy t ; t ; i t ; u t g. y t is log GDP, t is CPI in ‡ation, i t is the fed funds rate, and u t is the unemployment rate. I estimate the VAR on the full sample of data beginning in 1954:Q3 and ending in 2011:Q3 5 . To calculate the forecast of the unemployment change I forecast future unemployment using the VAR and set
2 This regression is related to the analysis of in ‡ation expectations in Coibion & Gorodnichenko (2008) . They draw conclusions concerning di¤erent expectations models from the response of in ‡ation expectations to various shocks. I show that the level of pessimism that exists after a recession is also useful for drawing conclusions concerning di¤erent expectational models. 3 The …rst regression is weighted using the survey's household weights. Estimating the …rst equation by collapsing the cross section into a single estimate for the percent of pessimists and using the resulting time series gave similar results. 4 It is possible that the survey question elicits expectations not about the strict change in unemployment but the average level of unemployment over the next 12 months minus the current level of unemployment. Repeating the analysis in the paper with this de…nition did not change the main conclusions.
5 More complicated VARs could be considered. But I will show that even this simple VAR is able to predict unemployment changes and individuals perform much more poorly than this simplistic, potentially misspeci…ed, VAR. Additionally, a univariate forecast using only unemployment correctly forecasts the sign of unemployment changes.
6 GDP is available only quarterly and the unemployment expectations are measured monthly. I require a procedure to impute monthly expectations from the quarterly VAR. Figure 1A in the appendix explains how I do this. The procedure results in VAR based expectations that are slightly lagged. Since I …nd that individuals look as if they are forecasting lagged unemployment changes relative to the unemployment changes they are asked to forecast, this procedure pushes the VAR closer to the data and strengthens the conclusion that the VAR does not fully represent the expectations contained in the data. Section 6 examines the impact of this assignment procedure and …nds it to not be signi…cant. Also, I have replicated the forecasts X t is a vector of twelve dummy variables each indicating a date corresponding to a speci…c number of months (zero to eleven) after the …rst time U t is negative at the end of a recession. (Since future unemployment changes become negative before the unemployment peak, these dates correspond to unemployment changes beginning a few periods before the unemployment peak dates.) I have data on expectations beginning in 1978, and treat the two recessions of the 1980s as one recession 7 , so each of these dummy variables equals one at exactly four dates. The …rst dummy variable equals one the …rst time U t is negative at the end of each recession and is zero otherwise, the second dummy variable equals one for the next month in each recession and is zero otherwise, and so on. The coe¢ cients on X t
give the mean level of the dependent variable across these four dates 8 .
I repeat these regressions to estimate the levels of pessimism, actual unemployment changes, and average forecasts before the recession as well, when unemployment begins to rise. For this calculation, I replace X t with a vector of dummy variables that mark months after unemployment begins to rise at the beginning of a recession 9 . begins to rise (month 0) up until 11 months into the recession. The levels of pessimism when unemployment begins to fall are high. One half to one third of the population is expecting unemployment to rise, when in fact it is falling. On the other hand, only a third of the population expects unemployment to rise when it is actually rising, at the beginning of the using monthly industrial production-however I choose to use GDP because it covers the whole economy and because of the well known link between GDP growth and unemployment. 7 I do this because there is no sustained unemployment recovery from the …rst recession of the 1980s. 8 The starting points for where U t is …rst negative are: 1983 month 7, 1993 month 2, 2003 month 12 and 2010 month 8. The …rst element of X t equals one for these dates and zero otherwise. The second element of X t equals one on the dates 1983 month 8, 1993 month 3, 2004 month 1 and 2010 month 9 zero otherwise, an so on. 9 The starting points for when U t is …rst This solid line plots the average fraction of pessimists at the end of the recession when unemployment begins to fall. 0 denotes the …rst month unemployment begins to fall, 1 the second, and so on. The dashed line with X markers plots the average fraction of pessimists at the beginning of the recession when unemployment begins to rise. 0 denotes the …rst month, 1 the second month and so on.
recession. In fact, there is substantially more pessimism at the end of the recession (when unemployment is falling) than at the beginning of the recession (when unemployment is rising). The coe¢ cients at the beginning of the recession are the dashed lines above zero, indicating that unemployment is rising and the VAR correctly forecasts the sign of these changes.
The coe¢ cients at the end of the recession are the solid lines below zero indicating that unemployment is falling and the VAR forecasts these changes as well.
To test the statistical signi…cance of these results I estimate the following three regressions: Y it = X t + Y t + " it where Y it = fP it ; U t ; E U t g; X t is a vector of dummy variables indicating zero months to …ve months after unemployment begins to fall at the end of a recession, and Y t is a vector of dummy variables indicating zero months to …ve months after This table tests if the coe¢ cients are signi…cantly di¤erent from each other. For the pessimism regression, the …rst three coe¢ cients on X t are signi…cantly di¤erent from the corresponding coe¢ cients on Y t indicating statistically signi…cantly more pessimism after the recession than during the beginning of the recession. Even the results for month four and …ve are puzzling. We see a statistically signi…cant, 1.3 to 1.7 percentage point di¤erence in unemployment forecasts but no statistically signi…cant di¤erence in the levels of pessimism.
The actual unemployment changes and VAR forecasts before the recession are all signi…cantly di¤erent than their counterparts after the recession.
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Expectations around recession turning points appear partially backward looking. To 10 I have omitted results for optimism -the percent of the population that expects unemployment to fallbut they support the main results here. There is three times as much pessimism than optimism at the end of a recession and the levels of optimism at the beginning and end of a recession are similar. 10 see if lag unemployment changes in ‡uence expectations across the whole sample I run the following regression:
P t is the fraction of the population at time t that expects unemployment to rise.
is the VAR forecast of the future unemployment change and u t u t 12 is the lag change in unemployment. Table 2 (2) to calculate E t 12 [u t u t 12 ] except when forecasting the unemployment rate beginning at time t the VAR coe¢ cients are estimated using data only through time t 1:
After the recession, during the recovery, a least squares learner would expect unemployment to fall. In fact, the prediction is on average more negative than the prediction of the VAR. This result is not surprising. Recall, the actual unemployment recovery from the recessions of 1991 and 2001 was much slower than would have been predicted based on past data alone. Therefore, the least squares learner expects more of a recovery than an individ- 
Real Time Data
In approximating expectations with the VAR, I assume agents have access to future data revisions. Instead, for the most recent data, they have access to only the …rst or second release, not the …nal revision. As argued by Orphanides (2001) and Orphanides & van Norden (2002) the use of real time data can change measurements of output gaps and the optimal choice of monetary policy. In ‡ation (measured with the CPI), the fed funds rate and unemployment are subject to only minor revisions, but GDP is often substantially revised.
To explore this issue, I make use of the real time data set available from the Federal Reserve
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Bank of Philadelphia (Croushore & Stark (1999) Now I consider and agent that only has access to the real time data when she makes her expectation, and also must learn about the parameters of the VAR Equation (2) 
Delayed Updating of Expectations
Several authors including Reis (2004) , Mankiw & Reis (2002) , Gabaix & Laibson (2001) and Carroll (2003) argue it is unreasonable to expect that consumers update their information instantaneously. They argue that to do so requires a cognitive cost and therefore, to economize on this cost, the agent will update his information infrequently.
I examine the ability of this model to account for the observed facts. Following Mankiw 12 To implement this procedure the data used to estimate the VAR must be in the same units as the real time data. As in the real time data I use, as the measure of output, GNP before 1992 and GDP afterwards. I convert the full sample output data to 1960 dollars using the appropriate de ‡ator. I then create a real time price index using the ratio of real time nominal output to real time real output and use this price index to convert the real time nominal output measure to 1960 dollars. (Note: When I consider least squares learning and the use of real time data, this procedure is no longer necessary because the real time data is used directly to calculate the VAR.) updating her expectation in any given period. Therefore the percent of the population that has expectations based on information n periods old is:
This formula implies that (1 ) n percent of the population has expectations that come from the following expression:
Here the forecasting equation is the VAR equation (2) estimated on the whole sample and the expectation is calculated using information only through time t n: 13 Importantly, this expression involves forecasting not only the future rate of unemployment but also the time t rate of unemployment when information is not completely up to date.
Since the delay model will only tell me the respondent's prediction for the change in unemployment, I need a procedure to assign the quantitative prediction to the qualitative categories "more" "less" and "stay the same." To do this I calculate c l the lower cuto¤, the point at which if the individual expects unemployment to fall by more than c l they are classi…ed as an optimist (expecting less unemployment) and c u the upper cuto¤, the point at which if the individual expects unemployment to rise by more than c u they are classi…ed as a pessimist (expecting more unemployment). Everyone else is classi…ed as expecting unemployment to be about the same. Therefore the percent of pessimists in the population at time is given by:
Again the procedure in Figure 1a shows how I assign monthly expectations using the quaterly VAR. 14 To implement this theory empirically, I assume that information is at most N periods old. I then rescale the percent of the population with information n periods old (so that they sum to one) using the following formula: I solve the minimization problem multiple times, each time for a di¤erent pair of c u and c l . To …nd the overall minimum I take the minimum across the solutions to the minimization problem at these di¤erent pairs of cuto¤s.
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The minimization occurs at an upper cuto¤ of 0:2, a lower cuto¤ of 0:4, and a value of of 0:0578. A value of 0:0578 implies that the agent updates her expectation roughly once every 17 quarters or once almost every four years. This is considerably more delay than is assumed, or estimated, in the literature. Carroll (2003) estimates and Mankiw & Reis (2002) take to be 0:25: This implies that the agent updates her expectations once every year. However more recent work, Reis (2004) has found optimal updating to be every 8 quarters. Note also that the data want to make it comparatively easier to be pessimistic (the upper cuto¤ is 0:2) than optimistic (the lower cuto¤ is 0:4). This fact is due to the tendency of respondents, on average, to more likely respond with pessimism than optimism. and the variance of the sample mean is given by
where w i are the survey weights.
16 It would be better to minimize over the three paramters, lambda and the two cuto¤s, simultaneously. However, without adding noise, the function is not su¢ ciently well behaved in the cuto¤s to make this a simple task. Because I want to …rst focus on the endogenous heterogenity of the model, not exogenous heterogenity from noise, I omit noise and therefore, I use the two step procedure described. In section 5, I explore estimation with noise.
Figure 5: Predictions of the Delay Model
The solid line plots the average fraction of pessimists at the end of the recession when unemployment begins to fall. 0 denotes the …rst month unemployment begins to fall, 1 the second, and so on. The dashed line plots the average fraction of pessimists at the beginning of the recession when unemployment begins to rise. 0 denotes the …rst month, 1 the second month and so on. The predictions of the delay model are plotted in the same way as the data except they are marked with an x. line). By having some agents base their expectations on old information, a substantial number of agents do not predict that unemployment will rise more that the pessimism cuto¤ Why does the delay model fail to match the percent of pessimists at the end of the recession? To answer this question I examined forecasts of unemployment changes at each point in time based on information which gets progressively older. (Table 4A in the appendix gives the details of this calculation.) The calculation showed that even with outdated information the forecast of the unemployment change at the recession's end are usually negative, and if positive, rarely larger than the pessimism cuto¤ of 0:2. To understand the intuition for this result it is useful to think about two cases.
First, consider a situation where the agent has only slightly old information. For example, the agent knows that unemployment has risen a few periods ago and does not know what happened since. An agent using a statistical forecast would not expect past unemployment changes to persist inde…nitely into the future, since he knows that unemployment declines eventually ‡atten out and then become negative as unemployment returns to its mean.
Therefore, when forecasting what happens at the end of the recession he expects a slight fall as unemployment returns to its mean. I did …nd a few slightly positive forecasts based on old information, hence some pessimism at the end of the recession, but they were small, and quickly went to zero.
Second think about a situation where the agent has very old information. He would predict more or less no change in the unemployment rate. This is intuitive. Most economists would not have an expectation about the change in the unemployment rate six years into the future from …ve years into the future. They would predict more or less no change in unemployment. As the age of the information used for the forecast increases, the forecast of the unemployment change goes towards zero. These individuals will not be pessimisticwhich makes it hard for the model to generate a large number of pessimists.
It is instructive to contrast this case with the case of forecasting in ‡ation. Since in ‡ation is close to a random walk, a forecast of in ‡ation today, based on information from two years ago, will not di¤er much from the level of in ‡ation two years ago. In this case, an agent will look fairly extrapolative, using past in ‡ation rates to forecast today's in ‡ation. However, unemployment changes are certainly not a random walk. And forecasts of unemployment changes today, based on old information, are not the same as unemployment changes from a few periods in the past.
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Extrapolative Expectations
Next I consider a model where a fraction of consumers forecast unemployment with the VAR and the rest form their expectations by taking a weighted average of past changes.
These agents form expectations according to:
where u t is the unemployment rate at time t and is a parameter that controls how much the recent past is weighted relative to the less recent past 17 . Therefore the percent of pessimists at time t is given by
where e is the percent of the population that are extrapolators, c u is the upper cuto¤, the point at which if the individual expects unemployment to rise by more than c u they are classi…ed as a pessimist, 1 is the indicator function, and E t [u t+12 u t ] is the expectation from the VAR (2).
To choose the percent of extrapolators, e, I solve the following problem: min For the VAR model, the least squares learning model, and the real time data models I assume that at every point in time the distribution of expectations in the population are given by:
where t is E t [u t+12 u t ] from the VAR equation (2), or the least squares learning model, or the real time data models, and with variance 2 which is a parameter to be estimated 18 .
One interpretation is that individuals observe the VAR forecast with noise and the noise has variance 2 . Furthermore, I estimate c l the lower cuto¤, the point at which if the individual expects unemployment to fall by more than c l they are classi…ed as an optimist and c u the upper cuto¤, the point at which if the individual expects unemployment to rise by more than c u they are classi…ed as a pessimist. Otherwise, they are classi…ed as expecting 18 Another method would follow the approach of Howrey (2001) and calculate the probability of unemployment rising at each point in time by sampling from the VAR residuals. I could use this probability to predict the percentage of pessimists at each point in time. I do not follow his approach for two reasons: 1) It is unclear why some individuals would expect a certain path of VAR residuals when they have an expected value of zero and 2) this method puts a restriction on the variance of the distribution around the VAR expectation. I prefer to make the variance a free parameter to give the model the best chance of matching the data. Even then I will …nd severe limitations of the VAR model. 21 unemployment to stay the same. Therefore the fraction of the population that is pessimistic at time t is given by
where is the normal cumulative distribution function evaluated at c u for mean t and variance 2 . To estimate the parameters of the model I solve the following problem:
where x is a vector of two observations per month for every month in the data set: the percent of people who respond that they expect unemployment to rise and the percent that expect unemployment to fall each subtracted from the model's prediction for these variables and W is a diagonal weighting matrix with the inverse of the variance of the data estimates on the diagonal (see section 4.3).
For the delay model, the estimation procedure is similar. First the population is broken up into individuals who base their expectations on information n periods old, for n = 0; :::N (N = 86): The percent of the population in each group is given by the same formula as in section 4.3. Then within these groups the expectations are given by
with n t equal to E t n [u t+12 u t ] (as in section 4.3) and variance 2 which is estimated along with the upper and lower cuto¤s. Then the model's prediction for the percent of the population that is pessimistic at time t is:
The exact problem solved is (6) with the predictions of the delay model replacing the predictions of the VAR model and also optimizing over the delay parameter :
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Finally, for the extrapolation model, I assume that at each point in time a fraction 1 e of the population has expectations which are given by (5) and another fraction, e of the population has expectations given by
where e t is given by the extrapolation equation (4). Therefore the percent of the population that is pessimistic at time t is given by:
Note that I assume extrapolators and rational agents have the same value of 2 . To estimate the parameters I solve (6) optimizing over e and from equation (4) as well as and the cuto¤s. Table 3 displays the estimated parameters. The models all need a large to match the data. The large is needed because at every point in time, even when the VAR expectation is signi…cantly positive or negative, there are a substantial number of pessimists and optimists.
The standard deviation is 3.8 for the VAR and real time models and above nine for the learning model and the learning model with real time data. It is about 2.2 for the delay model and 2.5 for the extrapolation model.
In addition, as shown in Table 1A , since there are many people who answer "about the same" to the unemployment question the large standard deviation forces the upper and lower cuto¤s to be fairly large. For example in the VAR model, an individual must expect unemployment to rise by more than 1.6 percentage points before they will answer "more unemployment" as opposed to about the same. This seems unreasonable; who would think that an increase in unemployment by 1.6 percentage points is unemployment being "about the same"? This discrepancy is more dramatic for the lower cuto¤s since people are unconditionally much more likely to be pessimistic than optimistic. The lower cuto¤s are: -4, -10, -4, and -10 for the VAR, LSL, real-time data and LSL with real-time data models respectively. The upper cuto¤s are more reasonable for the delay and extrapolation model: 0.9 and 1.1 respectively. The lower cuto¤s for these models are -2.3 and -2.7 respectively.
The delay parameter, ; is estimated to be 0.1586 and the percent of extrapolators is estimated to be 0.35. We can rank models by the minimum of the objective (6) One of the important facts in this paper was that the level of pessimism was higher after the recession than at the beginning of the recession. Only the extrapolation model matches this fact. All other models predict lower levels of pessimism at the end of a recession (solid line) than at the beginning of the recession (dashed line). Table 4 regresses the simulated fraction of pessimists on the VAR forecast and the lag change in unemployment to see if the models can replicate the relationship outlined in table 2. In the data, for this regression, the lag change coe¢ cient was 75% the VAR forecast coe¢ cient. The extrapolation model comes closest to matching this fact: the coe¢ cient on the lag change is 57% the coe¢ cient on the VAR forecast. For the delay model, the lag coe¢ cient is 12% the VAR coe¢ cient. The rational models fair poorly. The VAR, LSL, real-time data, and real-time data with learning model predict the lag change coe¢ cient should be essentially zero.
Extensions
Univariate Forecasting
If mean reversion in unemployment is a key feature of the VAR's ability to forecast unemployment than one should be able to obtain similar results with just a univariate forecast of unemployment. To see if a univariate forecasting rule can explain the patterns of pessimism I repeat the regression (1) for before and after the recession but instead of using the VAR forecast I use the univariate forecast from regressing unemployment on four lags of unemployment. forecasts. This test reveals how puzzling these pessimistic expectations really are. Even a naive and simple forecasting technique, ignoring all information in the economy except the past rates of unemployment is able, on average, to correctly predict the sign of future unemployment changes. This achievement, however, is a task many households in the survey are unable to perform.
This analysis is related to the work of Ball (2000) . He argues that the true structural model is one in which agents make univariate forecasts of in ‡ation as opposed to naive adaptive expectations. He shows his model is consistent with observed expectations in prewar versus post-war data. However, in this case, it appears a univariate unemployment forecast does not capture important features of individual unemployment expectations.
Finally, …gure 10 displays the exact univariate forecast. Recall that since GDP is available quarterly, I needed to use the procedure described in …gure 1A (in the appendix) to assign monthly expectations from the quarterly VAR. With monthly unemployment I can drop this assumption-which was used to calculate the univariate forecast-and use the exact 27 unemployment expectation from the univariate unemployment forecast to calculate the univariate forecast (exact) line. As one can see the two univariate forecasts are similar -in fact the exact forecast is more negative at the beginning of the recovery and more positive at the beginning of the recession deepening the inconsistency -and indicate that the assignment procedure does not drive the results. I also obtained similar forecasts using a monthly VAR with industrial production in place of GDP as an additional check.
Survey of Professional Forecasters
In The results, in Figure 11 show that professional forecasters exhibit more pessimism at the beginning of a recession than at the end and levels of pessimism among professional forecasters at the end of a recession die out quickly. They are much more accurate than household expectations. In table 4 I show the result of regressing the fraction of pessimism in the SPF on the VAR prediction of the unemployment change and the lag change in unemployment. For households the coe¢ cient on the lag change is 75% the coe¢ cient on the VAR. For professional forecasters this factor is only 39%.
19 Data and documentation are available at: http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-timecenter/survey-of-professional-forecasters/ 20 I classify the professional forecasters as pessimistic if they expect unemployment to rise by at least 0:2: Results are robust to di¤erent cuto¤s. Since data are available only quarterly, I assign expectations to the months as in Figure 1A .
Figure 11: Professional Forecasters
The solid line plots the actual level of pessimism after the recession; the dashed line plots the actual level of pessimism at the beginning of the recession. Along with these series I plot the fraction of professional forecasters that expect unemployment to rise by at least 0.2 points (x).
Who Make These Errors and Does it Matter?
The previous sections of the paper have argued that individual's unemployment expectations contain predictable deviations from statistical forecasts across the business cycle, namely insu¢ cient pessimism at the beginning of recessions and excessive pessimism during recoveries. Now, I use the survey data to examine characteristics associated with those whose expectations di¤er from the VAR and the impact these deviations have on buying attitudes. This section makes two points to demonstrate the importance of this paper's results.
Firstly, these deviations are consistent across the population and not con…ned to an economically unimportant group. Second, these deviations, especially pessimistic errors are associated with large changes in buying attitudes.
Characteristics Associated with Expectational Errors
To examine whose expectations are more likely to deviate from the VAR, I estimate the following regressions: Y it = F ( + X it + Z t ) + " it : Here Y it = either Error it which 29 equals one if the individual's response di¤ers from the VAR forecast and is zero otherwise 21 or P essimisticError it which equals one if the individual expects unemployment to rise and the VAR predicts it will not rise and it is equal to zero otherwise. X it is a vector of individual characteristics and Z t contains the lag unemployment rate and year …xed e¤ects.
22 I estimate the model both by OLS (F (x) = x) and probit (F = standard normal cdf). Table 5 contains the regression results. The …rst column contains the OLS results; the second column contains the marginal e¤ects (evaluated at the means) from the probit model.
I …nd that men are 1% less likely to make expectational errors. I …nd a non-monotonic e¤ect of age. Though the best and worst by age di¤er only by about three percent. An additional grade of education reduces the probability you make an error by 0.4 percent and college graduates are 0.3 percent less likely to make an error. Taken together these estimates imply education does little to mitigate these errors. Comparing a college graduate (with 16 years of education) with a individual with a 6th grade education, the college graduate is only 4.3% less likely to make an error in his unemployment expectations. Similarly, income has only a small impact on the probability of making an expectational error. The coe¢ cient on income is -0.000044. Since income is measured in thousands of year 2000 dollars, an individual with an annual income that is 100,000 dollars greater is only 0.44% less likely to make an error 23 . Finally, an individual being optimistic about his own …nances has a small e¤ect on the probability of making an error as does the individual's race.
Second, still in table 5, we turn to the characteristics associated with making a pessimistic error, expecting unemployment to rise when the VAR predicts otherwise. The coe¢ cient on being male is again -1%. The age coe¢ cients imply that the best and worst by age di¤er by about 4%. Being a college graduate has an insigni…cant a¤ect on the probability of making a pessimistic error, and the di¤erence in the probability of making a pessimistic error between 21 Here I use upper and lower cuto¤s of .2 and -.2 to classify responses into about the same, more unemployment and less unemployment. Results were robust to other choices for the cuto¤s. 22 While the data allow me to control for many individual characteristics, including the individual's own assessment of his …nances, it is not a panel survey and I can not control for unobserved heterogeneity with individual …xed e¤ects. 23 Using income in logs did not change the estimates of the income e¤ect signi…cantly.
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a college graduate and an individual with a 6th grade education is only 4%. The e¤ect of income on the probability of making a pessimistic error is larger: an individual with an annual income that is 100,000 dollars greater is 2% less likely to make an error. Taken with the results on income, the results on education imply that these errors are not made solely by an economically unimportant fraction of the population but are made fairly evenly across the income and education distributions.
The E¤ect of Errors on Buying Attitudes
Next I examine the e¤ect of unemployment expectations on buying attitudes. The survey asks the following three questions: 1."Generally speaking, do you think now is a good time or a bad time to buy a house?" 2."Speaking now of the automobile market, do you think the next 12 months or so will be a good time or a bad time to buy a car?" and 3."About the big things people buy for their homes, such as furniture, a refrigerator stove, television, and things like that. Generally speaking, do you think now is a good or a bad time for people to buy major household items?" For each item I run the following regressions:
where BadBuy it indicates the individual believes it to be a bad time to buy the item mentioned in the question above, P essimist it equals one if the individual expects unemployment to rise and is zero otherwise, P essError it equals one if the individual expects unemployment to rise contrary to the VAR and is zero otherwise, X it is a vector of individual characteristics as in the previous section and Z t contains the lag unemployment rate and year …xed e¤ects.
Importantly, I am able to control for the individual's optimism or pessimism about his own …nances. The model is estimated by OLS (F (x) = x) and probit (F = standard normal cdf). We would expect both coe¢ cients to be positive, being pessimistic about the future 31 is correlated with thinking that it is a bad time to make a large purchase. Table 6 shows the results, suppressing the control variable coe¢ cients. Both being pessimistic about future unemployment changes and making a pessimistic error has important e¤ects on buying attitudes. Being pessimistic or making a pessimistic error results in being 8% less likely to think it is a good time to buy a house, 10% less likely to think it is a good time to buy a car, and 8% less likely to think it is a good time to purchase of a durable good.
Conclusion
I have compared household unemployment expectations, measured by the Michigan Survey of Consumers, with the predictions of a four variable VAR containing GDP, the unemployment rate, the in ‡ation rate, and the fed funds rate. Three important facts emerged.
First, concerning the fall in unemployment at the end of the recession, there are above average levels of pessimism with half to one-third of the population expecting unemployment to rise even though the VAR predicts the fall in unemployment. Second, concerning the rise in unemployment at the beginning of a recession, fewer people had expected unemployment to rise than at the end of a recession when unemployment is falling even though the VAR predicted these changes. Finally, when regressing the percent of the population that expects unemployment to rise on the VAR prediction of the future unemployment change and the lag unemployment change, the lag change coe¢ cient was the same magnitude as the VAR prediction coe¢ cient. A model with a random expectations distribution around the VAR expectation underestimated the lag change coe¢ cient by a factor of 50.
I then examined the ability of other expectation models to match these facts. This pattern of expectations was not due to the unavailability of revised data. Least squares learning had an even harder time than the VAR explaining pessimism at the end of the recession. Similarly, delayed updating of expectations helped explain why there are few pessimists at the beginning of a recession but not why there are many pessimists at the end 32 of a recession. An extrapolative expectations model where agents partially form expectations by extrapolating current trends into the future, explained both insu¢ cient pessimism at the beginning of the recession and excessive pessimism at the end of the recession. In its …fth section, the paper demonstrated that among data simulated from the di¤erent expectational models, only data from the extrapolation model could match the facts outlined previously and the sixth section showed that even a simple univariate forecast could forecast the sign of unemployment changes. In addition, professional forecasters'expectations do not depart so dramatically from the VAR forecasts as households do.
While those with more education or greater income are less likely to make expectational errors (i.e. di¤ering from the VAR) the e¤ect is almost negligible; therefore expectational errors are not con…ned to an economically insigni…cant fraction of the population. Finally, when an individual expects unemployment to rise when in fact the VAR predicts it will fall, they are 8%-10% less likely to think it is a good time to make a major purchase.
Standard rational expectations models assume that individuals know the true model and make their expectations according to that model. In this paper I have tried to approximate the true model for unemployment using statistical forecasts -a VAR and a univariate forecast of unemployment changes. I have argued that individual forecasts vary substantially from these statistical forecasts and vary in a way that is predictable. Namely after an extended period of falling unemployment they are less likely to predict unemployment will rise than after an extended period of rising unemployment. However, a statistical forecast does the opposite -because of the mean reverting nature of unemployment. Most models of expectations: least squares learning, real time data and delayed updating of expectations can not explain these patterns. However a model in which some agents extrapolate past changes to form their expectations can. While it would be easier to tie expectations data to the predictions of theoretical models if we had better survey data (i.e. quantitative, and clearer de…nition of unemployment), the data quality does not appear to drive the results.
Firstly, the data are poorly approximated by a random distribution around the VAR expec-33 tations suggesting that the discrepancies in expectations is more than measurement error.
Secondly, expecting more unemployment gives a clear prediction of the sign of the future unemployment change and this prediction can be tested, and is tested in this paper.
The results in this paper suggest many avenues for further research. For one, the extrapolation model is quite ad hoc. Perhaps more complicated learning based models could provide a better foundation for the usefulness of extrapolation. Second, the results suggest that extrapolating agents could be used in macroeconomic models to potentially explaining various phenomenon: e.g. …nancial market participation, the persistence of recessions, and large changes in equity and housing prices. Finally, the results suggest that expectational errors, or undue pessimism may have important a¤ects on consumption through their e¤ects on buying attitudes. These consumption e¤ects warrant further study. The table contains the results of regressing, on a vector of variables indicating months since unemployment began to rise and months since it began to fall, if the individual expects unemployment to rise, the actual change in unemployment, and the VAR prediction of the change. Column one uses the survey's household weights. The rightmost columns contain the p-values of the test that the before and after coefficients are equal (by month). Standard errors are corrected for within month correlation in the first column and autcorrelation in the others using Newey-West with 3 lags. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% This table contains the results from regressing the percent of the population who expect unemployment to rise on a VAR prediction of the unemployment change and the lag unemployment change. The second column adds the actual unemployment change as a regressor. Standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation using a Newey-West procedure with 3 lags. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Value  11380  14669  12164  15027  11061  8044 This table gives the estimates of the parameters of the expectational models. The distibution of expectations is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance sigma around the caclulated expectation of the model, the individual is assigned to expect unemployment to rise if they expect a change above the upper cutoff, to expect unemployment to fall if they expect unemployment to fall more than the lower cutoff. lambda is the probability of updating expectations in the delay model and the extrapolation parameter in the extrapolation model. Finally the percent of extrapolaters are the percent of individuals who form their expectation by extrapolating past unemployment rate changes. In parentheses are the square root of the appropriate diagonal entry of (1/N)(d'Wd')^-1(d'WSWd)(d'Wd)^-1 where d = ∂ (F 1 … F 2T /∂β), β is the model parameters, evaluated at the estimated parameters, where W is the (inverse variance) weighting matrix and (F 1 … F N ) are the predictions of the model, and S is the (by year month block diagonal) covariance matrix of w i P i /w i,bar and w i O i /w i , bar , where P i is a dummy variable for expecting more unemployment, O i is a dummy variable for expecting less unemployment, w i are the survey weights, w i,bar is the mean of the survey weights, and N is the number of observations in the month with the minimum number of observations. This table repeats the first regression from table 2 but instead of using the actual number of pessimists it uses the number simulated from the different expectational models and from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% This table contains the results from regressing if the agent's response differs from the VAR (Error) and if the agent's response is "more unemployment" when the VAR predicts otherwise (Pessimistic Error) on individual characteristics. The first column, in each panel, gives OLS estimates the second column gives estimates of the marginal effects from a probit model. Regressions are weighted using the survey's household weights. Standard errors in brackets. The pessimistic error regression contains fixed effects for years. Observations fall in these regressions because I exclude years in which it is impossible for there to be a pessimistic error because the VAR predicts unemployment will rise. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Prob. Make Error Prob. Make Pessimistic Error This table presents the results from regressing individual reponses to questions about their buying attitudes on if they expect unemployment to rise (pessimist), if they expect it to rise when the VAR predicts otherwise (pessimistic error) and on individual characteristics. The first column, in each pair, gives OLS estimates and the second columns gives the marginal effects from a probit model. All regression includes year fixed effects and all the control variables from the previous regressions in Table 5 . Regressions are weighted using the survey's household weights. Standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% The average expected unemployment change at n months (first row) into the recovery (top panel) or recession (bottom panel) based on information k periods old (first column).
